Yes, Roman Catholics Teach Purgatory Is Retributive and Good Works Appease God

Every now and then, I have Roman Catholic friends who deny that the Roman Church teaches that purgatory is retributive. They also deny that good works are done to avert that retribution. What I want to do in this post is simply document the fact that purgatory is, per magisterial teaching, a place of retribution, and that good works are done in part to avert retribution.

Here’s what I mean by retribution: in purgatory, God exacts punishment on those who belong to him because they deserve it, in order to give them their just deserts. That is, punishment is inflicted to settle the score of justice.

This is not to say that Roman writers have taught this is the only function of purgatory or good works. Of course not. But rather, this is to affirm that the magisterium has consistently taught that this is one function of purgatory and good works that is distinct from the medicinal function of such.

So let’s document this.

The Roman System of Satisfaction

To understand this, we need to get a sense of the concept of temporal punishment. Temporal punishment is finite punishment owed to sin on account of the debt of sin left. In Baptism, God completely takes away all temporal punishment; for the Roman Catholic, if you were to die right after Baptism, you would go straight to heaven. No purgatory. However, after Baptism, if you commit a mortal sin, you re-incur both the eternal debt (or guilt) and temporal debt of sin. The guilt of sin is taken away solely by priestly absolution, whereas this leaves some temporal debt left. The function of penance, on this view, is to make satisfaction for that temporal debt.

Note the language of the Catechism of the Council of Trent (or the Roman Catechism). After listing the benefits of penance, one of which being that penance heals the wounds of sin (which we Protestants agreed with historically), it lists this as a distinct function:

Finally, the punishment which the sinner endures disarms the vengeance of God and averts the punishments decreed against us. Thus the Apostle says: If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged; but whilst we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord, that we be not condemned with this world. If all this is explained to the faithful, it must have great influence in exciting them to perform works of penance.

Now, could “divine vengeance” just be a way of talking about how sin has distorted the person? Nope. First, recall, this is listed as a distinct benefit of penance. But second, the Catechism addresses this very issue:

As then the foot does not perform its functions solely for itself, but also for the sake of the eyes, and as the eyes see not only for their own sake, but for the general good of all the members, so also works of satisfaction must be considered common to us all. This, however, is not true in reference to all the advantages to be derived from satisfaction. For works of satisfaction are also medicinal, and are so many remedies prescribed to the penitent to heal the depraved affections of the soul. It is clear that those who do not satisfy for themselves can have no share in this fruit of penance.

In Roman Catholic theology, one person can make satisfaction for another person. If I ask a mass to be done on behalf of Billy Bob, the priest can intend the fruits of the mass to be applied towards the remaining temporal debt Billy Bob has left for his sin. However, Billy Bob obviously does not gain more virtue through this act in itself (though of course, God might honor the intention by giving Billy Bob the gift of the Spirit).

This way of thinking is set within the overall thinking on satisfaction and punishment that goes back to St. Anselm. If I break your car with a bat and don’t compensate you (=satisfaction), I am liable to other more punitive measures to be exacted upon me. Satisfaction, then, averts punishment by being its alternative. The satisfaction of Christ is of infinite compensatory value, and as such can be offered to God for sin for all those who are united to Christ. But for whatever reason, God only partially applies the merits of Christ’s passion to those who are re-united to Christ after mortal sin. Now, I know what Roman Catholics will say: “Sean, that’s a straw man, because the merits of the Passion are the means through which satisfaction is made!” But it is no straw man, since this only means that the merits of Christ’s Passion secure the gift of the Spirit who empowers the believer to make satisfaction; it is not the case that the merits of Christ’s passion themselves cover or themselves satisfy the remaining debt of sin for post-Baptismal sin.

So, what happens if the believer fails to make full satisfaction for the remaining debt of sin? Purgatorial punishment, on this view, is the answer. Punishment falls in the absence of due satisfaction. Hence, Aquinas:

I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn above (III:86:4, III:86:5; Supplement:12:1) it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: "This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins." This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs the note of heresy.

Supplement, Appendix II,

We will end with the words of Martin Jugie, a famous Roman Catholic theologian of the 19th and 20th centuries, who explains the teaching as such in his celebrated book “Purgatory and the Means to avoid it”:

A soul may go to Purgatory, then, for three reasons:
1° on account of venial sins not remitted here on earth;
2° on account of vicious inclinations left in the soul through habits of sin;
3° on account of the temporal punishment due to every sin, mortal or venial, committed after Baptism and not sufficiently atoned for during life. Certain souls go to Purgatory for the third reason only, for they have brought to the Judgment Seat neither venial sins nor ingrained inclinations to vice. If a person dies with one single venial sin on his soul, he is condemned to Purgatory for the first and the third reasons, since venial sin, too, must be atoned for. Then, again, it can be safely said that no one goes to Purgatory solely for the second reason, since vicious inclinations do not in themselves constitute sins, and the majority of theologians hold with St. Thomas that these inclinations do not survive the first instant that follows separation of soul and body. They disappear in that instant; for the soul in a state of grace, once it finds itself in the presence of God, strains towards Him with ardour and hates intensely all that displeases Him. This violent turning-away from sin suffices to detach the soul from every inclination to commit sin, and gives to it a perfect moral rectitude. The position becomes perfectly clear, when it is remembered that the greater number—if not all—of vicious inclinations are linked in some fashion to sensibility and the organs of sense, whose exercise is suspended by the separation of body and soul effected by death.

What is said of vicious inclinations is true also of venial sins not remitted here below. The act of perfect Contrition breathed by the soul at the moment of death suffices to wipe out the guilt of venial sin, but there remain the ex­piatory chastisement fixed by Divine Justice. Here again is the doctrine of St. Thomas, and held by the best theologians. It would appear to be the only true one. The idea of progressive purification from venial sin as such and from vicious inclina­tions would appear to presuppose a sort of purification of souls separated from their bodies. We will demonstrate this presently.

It follows from all this, that the principal—one might even say the unique—reason for the existence of Purgatory, is the temporal punishment due to sins committed after Baptism, since neither venial sin nor vicious inclination sur­vives the first instant that follows death. Immediately on its entering Purgatory, the soul is perfectly holy, perfectly turned towards God, filled with the purest love. It has no means of bettering itself nor of progressing in virtue. That would be an impossibility after death, and it must suffer for love the just punishment which its sins have merited. It is not surprising, therefore, that the official definitions of the Church regarding Purgatory mention only the temporal punishment due to sin. Let us examine some of these. The Council of Florence, in the “Decree of Union with the Greeks,” says:

“As regards the faithful who die in true repentance,
before having satisfied for their sins of action and omission,
their souls are purified after death by expiatory pains;
and for their deliverance from pain, the suffrages of the
living faithful—the Sacrifice of the Mass, the prayers,
the alms and the other works of piety which the faithful
are accustomed to offer for the dead—are very efficacious.”